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1 Introduction 
 
Many central banks responded initially to the of 2008-09 global financial crisis by reducing 
policy interest rates sharply. When this failed to bring about the hoped-for recovery in nominal 
spending, several of them experimented with unconventional monetary policies (UMP), 
including large-scale asset purchases to raise asset prices and increase the supply of bank 
reserves, targeted asset purchases to alter the relative prices of different assets, and forward 
guidance to the public as to the future policy interest rate path. Though the empirical evidence is 
mixed, it is probably fair to say that the impact of these policies on nominal spending was 
disappointing, which lead many central banks to consider further policy measures.1 From 2012, 
seven central banks—the European Central Bank and the central banks of Denmark, Hungary, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan—sought additional monetary policy accommodation 
by broadening the scope of UMP to include negative policy interest rates (NPIR). The policy has 
been controversial: though most of the NPIR-adopter central banks gave their primary 
motivations for the policy as the stabilization of inflation expectations and supporting economic 
growth (Jobst and Lin 2016), many commentators viewed it as an intensification of a ‘currency 
war’ aimed at boosting export growth through exchange rate depreciation.2 Empirical evidence 
as to the impact of NPIR on exchange rates is scant, however. For example, Ball et al. (2016) 
survey recent developments in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in NPIR-adopter 
																																																						
1 See Bhattarai and Neely (2016) for survey of the empirical literature of the effects of UMP in the US. 
2 For a flavor of the debate, see for example, Jonathan Wheetley and Peter Graham, “Brazil in ‘currency war’ alert”, 
Financial Times, September 27, 2010; Shefali Anand and John Hilsenrath, “India’s central banker lobbies Fed”, 
Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2-13; Claire Jones, “Bundesbank chief rejects ‘absurd’ claim of euro 
manipulation”, Financial Times, February 7, 2016; The Economist, “The phony currency wars”, February 16, 2016; 
and John Plender, “Currency wars backfire for Japan and Europe”, Financial Times, April 15, 2016. 
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countries and conclude that exchange rate appreciation pressures were generally reduced and that 
the policy has been associated with an improvement in overall financial conditions and a modest 
expansion of credit in the euro area. Arteta et al. (2016) suggest that the impact of NPIR on 
exchange rates has been more varied with currencies depreciating on average against the U.S. 
dollar and on trade-weighted-terms, except for the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc. Jobst and 
Lin (2016) report that negative policy rates have had a muted impact on exchange rates as 
disinflationary dynamics in many countries with negative rates prevented real rates from 
declining further. Molyneux et al. (2017) focus exclusively on the impact of NPIR on bank 
lending and report that the policy resulted in weaker lending in NPIR-adopter countries relative 
to others, probably because it undermined bank profitability. More related to our study, Hameed 
and Rose (2016) employ a gravity model to examine how NPIR has impacted on exchange rate 
volatility, exchange rate changes, deviations from uncovered interest parity, and profits from 
carry trade; they report that the policy appears to have had little effect on observable exchange 
rate behavior. In this paper, we provide further empirical evidence on the currency war debate by 
examining whether NPIR has had positive exchange rate effects in adopter countries employing 
a panel of daily and monthly exchange rates for 32 countries and a difference-in-difference 
methodology. We find that NPIR resulted in a significant reduction in exchange rate volatility 
and in weaker exchange rates in NPIR-adopter countries relative countries that did not adopt the 
policy.  
 
2. Methodology and data 
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We examine the impact of NPIR on exchange rate behavior using a difference-in-difference 
equation of the following form:  
𝐹𝑋!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛽! 𝑇! ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛿𝑋!" + 𝜀!"  (1) 
where 𝐹𝑋! is the exchange rate variable in country i at time t, 𝑇! is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the country is in the treatment group (i.e., the country is an NPIR-adopter), 0 otherwise, and 
captures possible differences between the treatment and control groups prior to the policy 
change; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-NPIR adoption period in either the 
treatment or control group of countries and captures aggregate factors that would cause changes 
in exchange rate behavior even in the absence of a policy change; 𝑇! ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!  is the difference-
in-difference estimator that captures the difference in average exchange rate behavior between 
the treated and control groups, and 𝑋!" is a control vector. 𝐹𝑋!" is represented alternately by the 
volatility of the bilateral exchange rate, the natural logarithm of the level of the bilateral 
exchange rate, the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate index, and the natural 
logarithm of the levels of the nominal and real effective exchange rate indices. In 𝑋!" we control 
for the influence of other unconventional monetary policies on exchange rates represented by the 
growth of central bank assets, which reflects the dominance of extensive outright asset purchases 
aimed at expanding the central bank’s balance sheet as the main tool of UMP, and a newspaper-
based economic policy uncertainty index measure.  
 
As the European Central Bank was an early adopter of NPIR, and the euro zone comprised the 
largest “economy” to adopt the policy, the euro is the base currency for the analysis of 
developments in bilateral exchange rates, with exchange rates expressed in units of foreign 
	 5	
currency per euro. The sample period spans January 2010 to March 2017 and covers 32 high-
income and middle-income economies, seven of which adopted NPIR. The countries in the 
sample are listed in the Appendix. The sample begins in 2010 to reduce the after effects of the 
global financial crisis and associated recession, while including a period of comparable data 
before the onset of negative interest rates. Data on policy interest rates, daily and monthly 
bilateral exchange rates, and central bank assets are from the different central bank websites; 
nominal effective exchange rate indices and monthly real and nominal effective exchange rate 
indices are from the Bank for International Settlements. The monthly volatility of the bilateral 
and nominal effective exchange rates is measured by the standard deviation of the daily percent 
change in the exchange rate or index. The economic policy uncertainty measure is provided by 
Baker et al. (2016).3  Developments in the key central bank policy rates are shown in Figure 1 
and the dates of NPIR adoption and the motivations of each central bank for adopting the policy 
are provided in Table 1.4 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
Prior the estimation of equation (1), we check (but do not report) the stationarity of the variables 
using the panel unit root test suggested by Levin et al. (2002), and we test for cross-sectional 
dependence using the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) test. We find that for each 
variable the null hypothesis that the panels contain a unit root is rejected, whereas the null 
																																																						
3 These series can be downloaded from: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/. In the case of the individual European 
countries in our sample for which separate series are not available, we have used the authors European Policy 
Uncertainty index and for the non-European countries for which individual series are not available, we have used the 
authors’ Global Policy Uncertainty index. 
4 See Bech and Malkhozov (2015) for a discussion of the implementation mechanisms of NPIR in the adopting 
countries. 
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hypothesis of cross-section independence is not rejected.5 In Table 2, we report estimates of 
equation (1) for monthly exchange rate volatility and the level of the bilateral exchange rate. In 
column 1 the coefficient on the Post dummy variable indicates that exchange rate volatility 
increased through time while the coefficient on T*Post shows that relative to the control group, 
average exchange rate variability fell sharply in the NPIR adopter countries relative to that in the 
non-adopters; the average treatment effect is equivalent to an 13% decrease. Column 2 reports 
the results for the level of bilateral exchange rate. The bilateral exchange rates of these countries 
generally depreciated through time but the coefficient on T*Post indicates that the exchange 
rates of the NPIR-adopters depreciated by 3.9% more on average relative to those of non-
adopters. The estimates reported in columns 3 and 4 drop Norway and Hungary from the 
treatment group as these countries only adopted NPIR very late in the sample period. The results 
from this sample also suggest less exchange rate volatility (9.1%) and even more bilateral 
exchange rate depreciation (12.2%) for NIRP adopters. As regards the control variables, the 
growth of central bank assets appears to have been associated with a modest increase in 
exchange rate variability and an appreciation in bilateral exchange rates, while the policy 
uncertainty index appears to have had a modest positive impact.  
 
Table 3 reports estimates of equation (1) for the monthly volatility of the nominal effective 
exchange rate index and for the levels of the monthly nominal and real effective exchange 
indices. The NPIR adopters appear to have had a markedly different exchange rate experience on 
these measures also. The results in panel (a) include all six NPIR adopters in the treatment group. 
The volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate and its level fell sharply for the NPIR-
adopters relative to the other countries (11.8% and 6.8%, respectively). In contrast, NPIR 
																																																						
5 The results of these tests are available on request.  
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adoption does not seem to have been associated with any relative change in the real effective 
exchange rate for NPIR- adopters. In panel (b) we drop Norway and Hungary from the estimates. 
These results also indicate that NPIR-adopters experienced relatively less volatility and relatively 
more depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate, but no statistically significant 
difference in the behavior of their real effective exchange rates. 
We subject our results to two robustness tests. First, we estimate equation (1) for dollar-based 
bilateral exchange rate volatility and exchange rate levels to ensure that the currency base has not 
distorted the results. These estimates are reported in Table 4. The general conclusions do not 
change: NPIR adopter countries also experienced less bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility 
and greater bilateral exchange rate depreciation when the dollar is the currency base. Our second 
robustness test is more substantial. Equation (1) gives rise to an important econometric issue in 
evaluating the effect of NPIR when the decision to adopt the policy is not random. If NPIR 
adoption is systematically correlated with a set of variables that also affect the outcomes, then we 
will have the selection on variables problem, which makes linear regression with an NPIR 
adoption dummy an unreliable method.6 To address the self-selection problem, we make use of 
four propensity score matching methods that have been developed in the treatment effect 
literature and have been applied recently in applied economics (Glick et al., 2006; Lin and Ye 
2007, 2009, 2010, 2013; Thornton and Vasilakis, 2017). The first method is nearest-neighbor 
matching with replacement, which matches each treated country to the n control countries that 
have the closest propensity scores. We use two nearest-neighbor matching estimators: n=1 and 
n=3. The second method is radius matching, which performs the matching based on estimated 
propensity scores falling with a certain radius R. We use a wide radius (r=0.05), a medium radius 
																																																						
6 Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Heckman et al. (1998) provide detailed discussions. 
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(r=0.03), and a tight radius (r=0.01). The third method is the kernel matching method, which 
matches a treated group country to all control group countries weighted in proportion to the 
closeness between the treated group country and the control group country. The final method is 
the regression adjusted local linear matching method developed by Heckman et al. (1998).  
 
We first use the following probit model to estimate the propensity scores, which are the 
probabilities of adopting a NPIR policy conditional on a group of control variables: 
 𝑃 𝑌!" = 1 𝑋!" = Φ 𝑋!"! 𝛽 + 𝜂!"            (2) 
 
where 𝑌!" is a dummy variable for the adoption of NPIR, 𝑋!"!  is a set of control variables, Φ is the 
cumulative function of the standard normal distribution, and 𝜂!" is the error term. We then utilize 
the estimated propensity scores to conduct matching to obtain the treatment effects of NPIR 
adoption (compared to those of non-NPIR adoption). For the control variables, the limited NPIR 
literature discussed above suggests that the probability of a country adopting a NPIR is likely to 
be greater if it has a low level of inflation and a high rate of unemployment. In addition, the 
policy would seem more likely to be adopted by countries that had a relatively flexible rate 
regime and if the central bank was relatively independent. Accordingly, we include in our 
baseline probit estimation: the rate of consumer price inflation, the rate of unemployment, the 
relative flexibility of the exchange rate regime, and an index of central bank independence.7  
 
																																																						
7 The index of central bank independence is from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014); the exchange rate classification 
scheme is the “coarse” classification devised by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), which ranges from1 (most fixed) to 5 
(most free). The annual classifications were updated by Ilzetzki et al. (2008) and the classifications relate to those in 
place in 2010. 
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The probit results are reported in the columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.8 Broadly, the probability of 
a country adopting negative policy interest rates is greater if inflation is low, the exchange rate 
regime is more flexible, and the central bank is more independent; though contrary to what we 
would expect, the rate of unemployment appears to be negatively associated with the likelihood 
of NPIR adoption. The estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATTs) for the measures 
of exchange rate behavior are reported in Table 6. The results are a further indication that NPIR-
adopters reaped positive benefits from the policy, experiencing less exchange rate volatility and 
greater exchange rate depreciation relative to countries that did not adopt NPIR. In all cases, the 
ATTs are negative and in most they are highly statistically significant and quite large in 
magnitude. For example, for NPIR adopters bilateral exchange rate volatility and the bilateral 
exchange rate level (rows 1 and 2 of Table 6) fell between 11.5-33% and 10-62%, respectively, 
relative to the experience of non-adopters.9 Thus, NPIR adoption appears to have been associated 
with statistically significant and quite large positive effects on exchange rate volatility and 
exchange rate levels.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
From 2012, seven central banks sought additional monetary policy accommodation through the 
adoption of negative policy interest rates, a policy that several commentators and policymakers 
viewed as an intensification of the “currency war.” Our results employing a panel of daily and 
monthly exchange rates and a difference-in-difference methodology indicate that the policy 
																																																						
8 The sample of countries falls to 20 for the probit and propensity score matching analysis because of data 
constraints. 
9 We also estimated, but do not report, ATTs for dollar based bilateral exchange rates; these results are similar to the 
euro-based estimates. 
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benefited NPIR-adopters in terms less exchange rate volatility and more depreciated exchange 
rates relative to countries that did not adopt the policy. Accordingly, NPIR can be beneficial 
provided most trading partners do not adopt the same policy and that adopter countries are 
prepared to face opprobrium of their trading partners and the risk that they will retaliate.  
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Sources: National central banks.              
Notes: The central bank deposit rate refers to the rate on central bank current accounts beyond 
exemptions in Denmark, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland, and the rate on central bank deposit 
facilities in the euro area countries, Sweden and Hungary. 
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Table 1 
Overview of central banks with negative interest rate policy (NIRP) 
Country Date NIRP introduced Objective 
Denmark July 2012 Counter exchange rate 
appreciation pressure 
 
Euro area June 2014 Price stability and 
anchoring inflation 
expectations 
Hungary March 2014 Price stability and 
counter exchange rate 
appreciation pressures 
Japan February 2016 Price stability and 
anchoring inflation 
expectations 
Norway September 2016 Price stability 
Sweden September 2015 Price stability and 
anchoring inflation 
expectations 
Switzerland January 2015 Counter exchange rate 
appreciation pressure 
Sources: National central banks; Jobst and Lin (2016). 
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Table 2 
Panel fixed effects results for bilateral exchange rates (euro-based) 
 All NIRP adopters Excluding Norway and Hungary 
Dependent variable: Volatility Exchange rate 
level 
Volatility Exchange rate 
level 
     
Post     0.1480** 
   (0.0663)    
   -0.0283*** 
   (0.0106) 
    0.1739** 
   (0.0477) 
    0.0227 
   (0.0134) 
Treat*Post    -0.1303** 
   (0.0428) 
   -0.0394*** 
   (0.0146) 
   -0.0914* 
   (0.0533) 
   -0.1223*** 
   (0.0112) 
Central bank assets     0.0001*** 
   (0.0000) 
   -0.0002*** 
   (0.0000) 
    0.0001*** 
   (0.0000) 
   -0.1323*** 
   (0.0112) 
Policy uncertainty index 
 
    0.0001* 
   (0.0000) 
    0.0470 
   (0.0496) 
    0.0001* 
   (0.0000) 
   0.0240 
  (0.0490) 
Intercept     0.5149*** 
   (0.0254) 
    2.7180*** 
   (0.0179) 
    0.5149*** 
   (0.0264) 
    2.1383*** 
   (0.0184) 
    
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.001 0.167 0.12 
Observations 4,526 4,526 4,180 4180 
No. of groups 23 23 21 21 
Notes. All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. ***, * and *indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Panel fixed effects results for effective exchange rates	
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Nominal effective 
rate volatility 
Log of nominal 
effective rate level  
Log of real effective 
rate level  
(a) All treatment group countries 
Treat*Post    -0.1177*** 
   (0.0288) 
   -0.0677*** 
   (0.0107) 
   -0.0099 
   (0.0082) 
Post     0.1369*** 
   (0.0346)    
   -0.0290*** 
   (0.0118) 
    0.0567** 
   (0.0082) 
Central bank assets     0.0001*** 
   (0.0000) 
   0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) 
   -0.0020*** 
   (0.0000) 
Policy uncertainty index     0.0004 
   (0.0003) 
   0.0194 
  (0.0384) 
    0.0183 
   (0.0372) 
Intercept     0.4773*** 
   (0.0469) 
    4.6097*** 
   (0.0174) 
    4.5988*** 
   (0.0134) 
    
Adjusted R2     0.151     0.267     0.199 
Observations     4,860     4,860     4,860 
No. of groups     23     23     23 
    
b) Treatment group excludes Norway and Hungary 
    
Treat*Post    -0.0597* 
   (0.0318) 
   -0.0895* 
   (0.0521) 
    0.0046 
   (0.0402) 
Post     0.1647*** 
   (0.0315) 
   -0.1622 
   (0.0449) 
    0.0553 
   (0.0371) 
Central bank assets     0.0001*** 
   (0.0000) 
   -0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) 
   -0.0000*** 
   (0.0000) 
Policy uncertainty index 
 
    0.0003 
   (0.0003) 
   0.01237 
  (0.03994) 
    0.0123 
   (0.0377) 
Intercept     0.4664*** 
   (0.0468) 
   -4.6075*** 
   (0.0193) 
    4.5988*** 
   (0.0136 
    
Adjusted R2     0.143     0.378     0.134 
Observations     4,180     4,180    4,180 
No. of groups     21     21     21 
Notes. All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Panel fixed effects results for bilateral exchange rates (dollar-based)	
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All NIRP adopters Excluding Norway and Hungary 
Dependent variable: Volatility Exchange rate 
level 
Volatility Exchange rate 
level 
     
Treat*Post    -0.0999** 
   (0.0463) 
   -0.1563*** 
   (0.0112) 
   -0.0843** 
   (0.0274) 
   -0.1323*** 
   (0.0112) 
Post     0.0169 
   (0.0596) 
    0.0127 
   (0.0134) 
    0.0903 
   (0.0840) 
   -0.1768** 
   (0.0832) 
Central bank assets     0.0001*** 
   (0.0000) 
   -0.1323*** 
   (0.0112) 
    0.0001*** 
   (0.0000) 
    -0.1343*** 
   (0.0000) 
Policy uncertainty index     0.0003 
   (0.0003) 
    0.0004 
   (0.0057) 
    0.0005 
   (0.0008) 
     0.0001 
    (0.0008) 
Intercept     0.6489*** 
   (0.0309) 
    2.3453*** 
   (0.0184) 
    0.6434*** 
   (0.0310) 
    2.3384*** 
   (0.0218) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.23 0.033 0.012 
Observations 2550 2557 2550  
No. of groups 23 23 21 21 
Notes. All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  ***, ** and *indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Probit estimates of propensity scores for adopting negative policy interest rates 
 Euro-based, all 
countries 
Euro-based, excluding 
Norway and Hungary 
Inflation -0.344*** 
(0.0640) 
-0.564*** 
(0.0761) 
Unemployment -0.237*** 
(0.0443) 
-0.286*** 
(0.0540) 
Log Central bank independence  3.476*** 
(0.4724) 
 4.304*** 
(0.4745) 
Log Exchange rate regime  5.060*** 
(0.7151) 
 7.887*** 
(0.9729) 
Intercept -3.497*** 
(0.5503) 
-6.415*** 
(0.8306) 
   
Pseudo R2       0.372 0.460 
Observations      1426 1252 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical significance at the 
1% level. 
